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When Shopbots Meet Emails: Implications for Price Competition on the
Internet
Abstract

The Internet has dramatically reduced search costs for customers through tools such as shopbots. The
conventional wisdom is that this reduction in search costs will increase price competition leading to a decline
in prices and profits for online firms. In this paper, we provide an argument for why in contrast to conventional
wisdom, competition may be reduced and prices may rise as consumer search costs for prices fall. Our
argument has particular appeal in the context of the Internet, where email targeting and the ability to track
and record customer behavior are institutional features that facilitate cost effective targeted pricing by firms.
We show that such targeted pricing can serve as an effective counterweight to keep average prices high despite
the downward pressure on prices due to low search costs. Surprisingly, we find that the effectiveness of
targeting itself improves as search costs fall; therefore prices and profits can increase as search costs fall.
The intuition for our argument is as follows: Consider a market where consumers are heterogeneous in their
loyalty as well as their cost per unit time to search. In the brick and mortar world, it takes consumers a very
large amount of time to search across multiple firms. Therefore few customers will search in equilibrium
because the gains from search will be relatively small compared to the cost of search. In such a market, a firm
will not be able to distinguish whether its customers bought from it due to their high loyalty or due to their
unwillingness to search for low prices because of the high search cost.
On the Internet, the amount of time to search across multiple stores is minimal (say zero). Now irrespective of
their opportunity cost of time, all consumers can search because the time to search is negligible. If in spite of
this, a consumer does not search in this environment, she is revealing that her loyalty to the firm that she buys
from is very high. The key insight is that as search becomes easy for everyone, then lack of search indicates
strong customer loyalty and thus can be used as a proxy to segment the market into loyal and price sensitive
segments.
Thanks to email technology, firms can selectively set differential prices to different customers, i.e. a high price
to the loyal segment and a low price to the price sensitive segment, at relatively low cost. The increased
competition due to price transparency caused by low search costs can thus be offset by the ability of firms to
price discriminate between their loyal (price insensitive) customers and their price sensitive customers. In
fact, we find that it can reduce the extent of competition among the firms and raise their profits. Most
surprisingly, the positive effect of targeting on prices improves when search costs fall, because firms can learn
more about the differences in customer loyalty, thus improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing. The
effectiveness of targeted pricing however is moderated by the extent of opt-in by customers who give their
permission for firms to contact them directly by email.
Our analysis offers interesting strategic insights for managers about how to address the competitive problems
associated with low search costs on the Internet:
(1) It suggests that firms should invest in better technologies for personalization and targeted pricing so as to
prevent the Internet from becoming a competitive minefield that destroys firm profitability. In fact we show
that low search costs can facilitate better price personalization and can thus aid in improving the effectiveness
of targeted pricing efforts.
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(2) The analysis also offers guidelines for online customer acquisition efforts. The critical issue for
competitive advantage is not in increasing market share per se, but in increasing the loyalty of customers.
While a larger share of very loyal customers reduces competitive intensity, surprisingly a larger share of
customers who are not very loyal can be a competitive disadvantage. In order for customer acquisition to be
profitable, it should be accompanied by a superior product or service that can ensure high loyalty.
(3) Investing in online privacy initiatives that assures consumers that their private information will not be
abused other than to offer them “deals” is worthwhile. Such assurances will encourage consumers to opt into
firm mailing lists. This facilitates successful targeting which in turn ameliorates the competitive threats due to
low search costs on the Internet.
(4) When the overwhelming majority of customers are satisfied with online privacy, the remaining privacy
conscious customers who are not willing to pay a higher price to maintain their privacy will be left out of the
market. While this may be of some concern to privacy advocates, it is interesting that total consumer welfare
can be higher even if some consumers are left out of the market.
Our analysis captures the competitive implications of the interaction between two institutions facilitated by
the Internet: Shopbots and Emails. But the research question addressed is more fundamental: What is the
nature of competition in an environment with low costs for both consumer search and firm-to-consumer
personalized communications? The strategic insights obtained in the paper may be beneficially applied even to
offline businesses that can replicate such an environment. For example, offline firms could have websites on
which they post prices allowing for easy price comparisons. They could also use tools such as frequency
programs to create addressable databases that enable them to communicate with customers by direct mail and
email (as many airlines and stores do).
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When Shopbots Meet Emails:
Implications for Price Competition on the Internet
Abstract

The Internet has dramatically reduced search costs for customers through tools such as
shopbots. The conventional wisdom is that this reduction in search costs will increase price
competition leading to a decline in prices and profits for online firms. In this paper, we provide an
argument for why in contrast to conventional wisdom, competition may be reduced and prices may
rise as consumer search costs for prices fall. Our argument has particular appeal in the context of the
Internet, where email targeting and the ability to track and record customer behavior are institutional
features that facilitate cost effective targeted pricing by firms. We show that such targeted pricing
can serve as an effective counterweight to keep average prices high despite the downward pressure
on prices due to low search costs. Surprisingly, we find that the effectiveness of targeting itself
improves as search costs fall; therefore prices and profits can increase as search costs fall.
The intuition for our argument is as follows: Consider a market where consumers are
heterogeneous in their loyalty as well as their cost per unit time to search. In the brick and mortar
world, it takes consumers a very large amount of time to search across multiple firms. Therefore few
customers will search in equilibrium because the gains from search will be relatively small compared
to the cost of search. In such a market, a firm will not be able to distinguish whether its customers
bought from it due to their high loyalty or due to their unwillingness to search for low prices because
of the high search cost.
On the Internet, the amount of time to search across multiple stores is minimal (say zero).
Now irrespective of their opportunity cost of time, all consumers can search because the time to
search is negligible. If in spite of this, a consumer does not search in this environment, she is
revealing that her loyalty to the firm that she buys from is very high. The key insight is that as search
becomes easy for everyone, then lack of search indicates strong customer loyalty and thus can be
used as a proxy to segment the market into loyal and price sensitive segments.
Thanks to email technology, firms can selectively set differential prices to different
customers, i.e. a high price to the loyal segment and a low price to the price sensitive segment, at
relatively low cost. The increased competition due to price transparency caused by low search costs
can thus be offset by the ability of firms to price discriminate between their loyal (price insensitive)
customers and their price sensitive customers. In fact, we find that it can reduce the extent of
competition among the firms and raise their profits. Most surprisingly, the positive effect of targeting
on prices improves when search costs fall, because firms can learn more about the differences in
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customer loyalty, thus improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing. The effectiveness of targeted
pricing however is moderated by the extent of opt-in by customers who give their permission for
firms to contact them directly by email.
Our analysis offers interesting strategic insights for managers about how to address the
competitive problems associated with low search costs on the Internet:
(1)

It suggests that firms should invest in better technologies for personalization and targeted
pricing so as to prevent the Internet from becoming a competitive minefield that destroys firm
profitability. In fact we show that low search costs can facilitate better price personalization
and can thus aid in improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing efforts.

(2)

The analysis also offers guidelines for online customer acquisition efforts. The critical issue for
competitive advantage is not in increasing market share per se, but in increasing the loyalty of
customers. While a larger share of very loyal customers reduces competitive intensity,
surprisingly a larger share of customers who are not very loyal can be a competitive
disadvantage. In order for customer acquisition to be profitable, it should be accompanied by a
superior product or service that can ensure high loyalty.

(3)

Investing in online privacy initiatives that assures consumers that their private information will
not be abused other than to offer them “deals” is worthwhile. Such assurances will encourage
consumers to opt into firm mailing lists. This facilitates successful targeting which in turn
ameliorates the competitive threats due to low search costs on the Internet.

(4)

When the overwhelming majority of customers are satisfied with online privacy, the remaining
privacy conscious customers who are not willing to pay a higher price to maintain their privacy
will be left out of the market. While this may be of some concern to privacy advocates, it is
interesting that total consumer welfare can be higher even if some consumers are left out of the
market.
Our analysis captures the competitive implications of the interaction between two institutions

facilitated by the Internet: Shopbots and Emails. But the research question addressed is more
fundamental: What is the nature of competition in an environment with low costs for both consumer
search and firm-to-consumer personalized communications? The strategic insights obtained in the
paper may be beneficially applied even to offline businesses that can replicate such an environment.
For example, offline firms could have websites on which they post prices allowing for easy price
comparisons. They could also use tools such as frequency programs to create addressable databases
that enable them to communicate with customers by direct mail and email (as many airlines and
stores do).
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1. Introduction
There is a standard argument in the theoretical literature on price search that as consumer
search costs fall, competition will intensify in response to the greater transparency in prices. This
argument implies that on the Internet, which is characterized by extremely low search costs
(where customers can find out prices across a large number of online stores through technologies
such as shopbots), price competition will be very intense and profitability will be low.
Theoretical papers such as Bakos (1997), Zettelmeyer (1998) and conceptual discussions as in
Alba et al (1997), Shapiro and Varian (1999) have come to a similar conclusion. Such arguments
have also had tremendous impact among business professionals and the popular press.
For example, in his 1995 bestseller 'The Road Ahead', Bill Gates suggests that the
Internet "will carry us into a new world of low-friction, low-overhead capitalism, in which
market information will be plentiful and transaction costs low. It will be a shopper's heaven." A
Business Week article tellingly titled, " A Market Too Perfect for Profits", (Kuttner, 05/11/98)
says "The Internet is a nearly perfect market because information is instantaneous and buyers can
compare the offerings of sellers worldwide. The result is fierce price competition, dwindling
product differentiation, and vanishing brand loyalty."
The logical question that follows from this line of argument however is the question
asked in a Los Angeles Times article, "If the Internet offers the "lowest prices on Earth" just a
mouse click away, … then who can make any money?" (Gaw, 12/14/98) Yes, if all that the
Internet serves is to intensify price competition, why would any firm invest on the Internet? We
do see some well-publicized failures of some big name e-tailers such as EToys and Pets.com.
But is such fate inevitable for the surviving e-tailers too?
In this paper, we provide an argument for why in contrast to conventional wisdom,
competition may be reduced and prices may rise as consumer search costs for prices fall. Our
argument has particular appeal in the context of the Internet, where shopbots, email targeting and
the ability to record and track customer behavior are institutional features that facilitate the
applicability of our argument. We show that our argument may help to resolve the apparently
divergent findings in empirical research on the average levels of prices on the Internet.
The basic intuition for our argument is as follows: Consider a market where consumers
are heterogeneous in their loyalty/preference as well as their costs per unit time to search.
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Suppose in one environment (as in the brick and mortar world), it takes consumers a very large
amount of time to compare prices across multiple firms. In such an environment, very few
customers will search prices of different firms because the gains from search will be relatively
small compared to the cost of doing it. A firm in such a market will not be able to distinguish
customers who bought from it due to their high loyalty from those who bought from it due to
their unwillingness to search for low prices because of the high search costs.
Now suppose in another environment (as in the online world), the amount of time to
search across multiple firms is minimal (say zero). Now irrespective of their opportunity cost of
time, all consumers can search because the time to search is negligible. If in spite of this a
consumer does not search in this environment, she is revealing that her loyalty to the firm that
she buys from is very high. This enables the firm to segment the market in terms of customer
loyalty. If firms can then set differential prices, i.e. a high price to the loyal (price insensitive)
segment and a low price to the price sensitive segment, the increased competition due to price
transparency caused by low search costs can be offset by the increased ability for firms to price
discriminate. In fact, under certain circumstances, the competition among firms can be reduced
to the extent that their profits can actually rise with a decline in consumer search costs for price
information.
The central idea of the above argument is that as search becomes easy for everyone, then
lack of search indicates consumer loyalty and thus can be used as a proxy to segment the market.
However, if search is hard, then lack of search can either indicate that consumers have high value
for time or that they are highly loyal to firms. Consequently, firms are unable to segment the
market in such an environment leading to greater competition and lower profits.
Critical to the applicability of our argument is that firms should be able to track the
individual customer’s behavior over time so that they can classify the customer into a loyal or
price sensitive customer. On the Internet, it is relatively easy to record a customer’s shopping
behavior and categorize the customer into segments. Furthermore, in order to profit from the
segmentation information revealed by consumer price search, firms should be able to selectively
offer lower prices to the price sensitive consumers relative to the loyal consumers. On the
Internet, such a price discrimination strategy can be implemented by selectively delivering email
coupons to price sensitive customers (because firms have access to email addresses of
consumers), while the loyal customers pay the higher prices posted on firms’ websites. For
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example, companies such as Amazon, Barnes and Noble and Wine.com routinely use purchase
histories of customers to pepper them with offers (Stellin, 08/21/2000). Email targeting is
effective because emails can be delivered instantaneously and the responses are also relatively
fast comparing to the promotional offerings in the offline world. According to the New York
Times, “Email is a relatively inexpensive marketing tool, ranging from a penny to a quarter for
each message, compared to $1-$2 for each piece of direct mail campaigns in the actual world.
Moreover, email campaigns produce immediate results, no small factor in an industry, where
speed is critical.” (Stellin, 08/21/2000). Email marketing has been progressively increasing with
Forrester Research and eMarketer forecasting its growth in excess of 100% annually.1 With
email targeting, firms are able to effectively utilize information about consumer loyalty (gleaned
by observing consumer purchase activities) to segment the market and set targeted prices. As
search costs drop and more consumers search online, firms can learn more about its customers.
This can improve the effectiveness of targeted pricing and can help raise firms’ prices and
profits. Surprisingly, it is even possible for firms’ prices and profits to be higher when consumer
search cost is zero than when it is infinite.
As firms’ ability to gather consumer information and send targeting emails increases on
the Internet, so does consumers’ concern for their privacy. Both consumers and firms are now
increasingly taking online privacy seriously. Typically, customers can choose to “opt-out”
(where customers by default receive emails, but can choose not to participate) or “opt-in” (where
customers will not be included by default in mailings, but will need to explicitly sign in) for
mailings from firms (Petersen, 02/12/2001). Such policies are a means of obtaining permission
from customers to send them email offers and are also referred to as “permission marketing”
(Godin and Peppers, 1999). Permission marketing of course limits the ability of firms to
operationalize the segmentation of the market. From our modeling viewpoint, we do not
distinguish between opt-in and opt-out policies and will use the term "opt-in". Our model
indicates that “opt-in” is a critical variable. It reflects the permission or trust a firm gets from the
consumers to communicate with them directly. At low levels of “opt-in”, only posted prices are
effective and competition online is similar to the offline market where lower search costs

1

The Forrester forecast is discussed in Stellin (08/21/2000) and the eMarketer forecast is provided in the eMail

Marketing Report by the firm eMarketer.
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intensify competition. As “opt-in” increases, firms can price discriminate their consumers more
effectively and their profitability increases as consumer search costs fall. In fact, beyond a
critical level of “opt-in,” the posted price will become so high that only the loyal segments in the
market will buy the product at the posted prices and the price-sensitive but privacy conscious
customers who opt out will find it not worthwhile to buy the product at posted prices. Thus as
opt-in increases to a critical level with consumers gaining confidence in the technologies that
help guard privacy, the remaining privacy conscious customers who do not opt-in will be left out
of the market.
In recent empirical research there appears to be some divergence in the findings of
average levels of posted prices at Internet stores. While Bailey (1998) found that average levels
of prices for books and CDs were higher online than offline between 1996-1997, Brynjolfsson
and Smith (2000) found that the average levels of prices for books and CDs were lower online
than offline in 1999. Clay et al. (2001) however find that the average prices for books have been
increasing online between mid 1999 to January 2000. If all of these results were indeed
consistent, then online posted prices should have followed a U-shaped pattern with prices falling
between 1997 and 1999 and then rising towards 2000. If we recognize that the costs of consumer
search have continued to fall and email targeting activities have continued to increase over this
period, the predictions from our model would be consistent with such a U-shaped pattern on
posted prices.
The findings in this paper should be contrasted with two closely related streams of
research in the literature: In the first stream of literature linked to search costs, Bakos (1997)
showed in an influential paper that the low search costs make electronic marketplaces vulnerable
to intense competition. Zettelmeyer (1998) argued that firms can strategically manipulate the
level of search costs and thus the intensity of competition by making it harder for consumers to
judge the quality of products. Lal and Sarvary (1999) classify goods as those with primarily
digital attributes and non-digital attributes2 and show that the Internet can reduce the intensity of
competition for goods with non-digital attributes when search costs fall. Unlike Zettelmeyer
(1998) and Lal and Sarvary (1999), we do not appeal to quality uncertainty arguments when

2

A digital attribute is one that can be communicated easily over the web. Non-digital attributes are things such as

texture of clothes etc. which cannot be communicated over the web.
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showing that low search costs can decrease competitive intensity. Our results are particularly
applicable to product categories such as books and CDs, for which quality uncertainty and nondigital attributes are not critical.
This paper is also closely tied to the literature on targeting. Thisse and Vives (1988) and
Shaffer and Zhang (1995) show that competition will become more intense as firms can target
consumers. They assume that firms have perfect information on the consumers being targeted.
However, Chen et al (2001) show that market competition can be softened by firms’ targeting
activities when their information on consumers is not precise. In contrast to Chen et al. (2001),
we are able to show that competitive intensity can be reduced in a low search cost environment
even if firms can target consumers with perfect information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §2, we introduce the basic model and in
§3, we analyze the basic model and discuss the main results of the paper. In §4, we discuss
several extensions and also relax some of the technical assumptions of the basic model to check
the robustness of the results. §5 concludes.

2. Model
Consider two competing firms in a product category selling through the Internet. The
marginal production cost of each firm is assumed to be zero without loss of any generality. Each
firm i has two loyal segments of customers: a "strong loyal segment", si, and a "weak loyal
segment", wi. Consumers in the strong loyal segment, si, have a reservation price rs for firm i’s
product and they will never switch to buy from firm j (j=3-i). However, consumers in the weak
loyal segment, wi, have a reservation price rw for firm i’s product and a reservation price rw-L for
firm j’s product. Therefore, firm i’s weak loyal consumers will switch to buy from firm j if the
price difference between two firms is larger than L, i.e. if pi-pj>L, and pj≤ rw. We assume that
rw<rs, implying that consumers in the strong loyal segment have higher willingness to pay than
those in the weak loyal segment. The strong loyal segments in our model are similar to the loyal
segments in the model used by Narasimhan (1988) and the weak loyal segments in our model are
similar to the consumer segments in the model used by Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990). Each
consumer makes a purchase decision to maximize her consumer surplus and buys at most one
unit from the product category. If a consumer is indifferent between buying from a firm and
making no purchase at all, we assume that she will make the purchase. Without loss of any
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generality to our results, we further assume rw =1, rs =r, and the size of each of the four
segments (two weak loyal and two strong loyal segments) to be equal to 1.
When consumers use shopbots (e.g. Mysimon.com), they can find prices across a large
number of online stores at one shot with a few mouse clicks. We assume that consumers use
shopbots to search online and the cost of using shopbots to compare prices of the two firms is ci
for consumer i. ci is distributed uniformly between 0 and C in all consumer segments. The
heterogeneity in consumer search costs can result from the difference in consumers' technical
savvy with the Internet and shopbots, the speed of their Internet connection and their value of
time.
Given the consumer segmentation described earlier, it is obvious that consumers in the
strong loyal segments have no incentive to search for the price information of the competing
firms in the market. Price comparison provided by a shopbot has no value to those consumers
because their shopping decisions will not be affected by the price comparison.

However,

consumers in the weak loyal segment have incentives to search for price information, because it
is optimal for them to switch from the firm they are weakly loyal to if the price at the other firm
is low enough.

This feature of our model captures a simple but important aspect of consumer

price search behavior: The search behavior of a consumer is determined not only by her search
cost but also by her expected gains from search. Due to the heterogeneity in consumers' à priori
preferences (loyalty) for the two firms, even consumers with the same search cost may have
different observed search behavior. Empirically, Johnson et al. (2001) find that consumer search
activities for books, CDs and travel sites are quite heterogeneous even though shopbots can be
used to compare prices at low search costs.
Denote β to be the proportion of consumers in either firm's weak loyal segment who use
shopbots to search firms' prices. These "price searchers" may switch firms if the price difference
between two firms is larger than L. The remaining consumers who do not search, shop at the
firm they are loyal to. We should expect that the proportion of consumers that search prices will
increase when consumer search cost ci decreases and/or the expected gain from price
comparison, g, increases. Therefore, β=β(C,g) with

∂β
∂β
≤ 0 and
≥ 0 . In the basic model
∂C
∂g

here, we treat β as exogenous. In §4, we will extend the basic model to formally model
consumer price search behavior as endogenously determined by search cost and the expected
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gain from price comparison. Our main conclusions from the basic model are robust to such an
extension.
While the Internet enables consumers to compare prices across multiple competing firms
at one shot through shopbots, it also enables firms to contact consumers directly with targeted
email offerings such as electronic coupons. Importantly, a firm's targeting ability is highly
related to the consumer’s level of search. As consumers search more, firms can also target more
consumers with more precisely targeted prices.

Consider the following example: Without

consumer search, a consumer in Firm 2's weak loyal segment, w2, will never search and always
buy from Firm 2. Consequently, Firm 1 will have no information about consumers in w2 unless it
buys such information from external data vendors. However, if β proportion of w2 consumers
searches both firms' prices, they may visit and purchase from Firm 1. Consequently, Firm 1 will
be able to record information about them and potentially target them with emailed coupons.
Furthermore, because the Internet enables firms to observe competitors' prices easily (with
technology similar to shopbots, that have been dubbed “pricebots”3), firms will be able to
identify the type of consumers in their database if there are price variations in the market and
consumers stay in the market for a sufficiently long time.

For instance, from Firm 1's

perspective, consumers who purchased at 1<p1≤r must be its strong loyal customers; consumers
who never purchased at p1>1 but purchased at p1≤1 and p1-p2>L must be its weak loyal
customers who do not search; consumers who only purchased at p1 ≤ 1 and p1-p2 < -L must be its
competitor's weak loyal customers who search, and the remaining consumers must be its weak
loyal customers who search.
To operationalize the above discussion on the interaction between consumer price search
behavior and firms' email targeting ability, we assume that each firm has a database with
individual level information on consumers in 1) its strong loyal segment, si, 2) the proportion of
its weak loyal segment that do not search, wi(1-β), 3) the proportion of its weak loyal segment that
search, wiβ, and 4) the proportion of its competitor's weak loyal segment that search, wjβ. Firms
can identify each consumer in its database in terms of her membership in the segments of si,

3

Buy.com boasts that it offers “the lowest prices on earth” by regularly monitoring the competitive prices and

updating its prices, using such technology.
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wi(1-β), wiβ, and wjβ, and can potentially target them with different prices through promotional
offers such as electronic coupons.4
Because of the time constraints in reading emails and the growing concerns about online
privacy, some consumers may not read or want to be targeted by emails. Typically firms give
consumers the option to either "opt out" of an email list or "opt in" to an email list. We do not
distinguish between opt-in and opt-out policies and will use the term "opt-in" hereafter.
Actually, we will use the term "opt-in" in an even broader sense in the paper by treating
consumers who receive targeting emails but do not open or read them as if they have not "opted
in".
As long as the cost of checking an email is nonzero, a firm's strong loyal consumers and
weak loyal consumers who do not search (i.e. consumers in si, and wi(1-β)) have no incentive to
opt in. A firm sending email to such a consumer will optimally set the targeting price equal to
her reservation price because there is no competition from the other firm for the consumer.
Therefore the consumer will have no gain from reading the email, but incur a non-zero cost to
check it. As a result, the expected utility gain from reading a target email is negative for a
consumer in segments si, and wi(1-β). Hence consumers who do not search will have no incentive
to opt-in and therefore cannot be targeted by firms. This further illustrates the strong correlation
between consumers' search behavior and firms' targeting ability.
However, consumers who search for prices have incentive to receive and read emails
because firms have incentive to compete for them with prices lower than posted prices on their
websites. We assume that θ proportion of consumers who search for prices are potentially
responsive to firms' email targeting, i.e. they have opted in. The remaining consumers either
ignore targeting emails or choose to not receive emails because of time constraint or privacy
concerns. θ can also be interpreted as a measure of consumer acceptance to targeting emails or
the effectiveness (responsiveness) of targeting emails.
The marginal cost of sending a targeting email is assumed to be zero, consistent with the
relatively low cost of sending an email message relative to direct mail. Each firm simultaneously
sets its posted price pi to all consumers and email targeting prices pxie (x=wiβθ or wjβθ) to its own
weak loyal consumers and its competitor's weak loyal consumers who search prices and opt in.
4

Our results will not be changed even if firms cannot distinguish consumers from si, and wi(1-β).
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The basic model described in this section is parsimonious in nature but it captures the key
economic effects resulting from the interaction between consumer search behavior and firms’
targeting activities. There are only four parameters in the basic model: r reflects the degree of
consumer heterogeneity; L reflects the intensity of competition in the market; β reflects the
magnitude of consumer search; θ reflects the extent of consumer acceptance to email targeting;
and consequently βθ reflects the magnitude of firms' targeting activities.
Before we proceed to the formal analysis of the model, we make three additional
technical assumptions. First, we assume that 1<r<2. This assumption guarantees that each firm
will sell to both of its two consumer segments in the absence of consumer search. Second, we
assume that

1
1
<L< . This assumption makes it possible for weak loyal consumers to switch in
6
3

equilibrium and ensures tractability for the model.5 Finally, we assume that consumers incur no
cost to go to the website of the firm they are loyal to.6 Thus, a consumer may still visit the
website of the firm she is loyal to and buy from there even if she expects to be charged at her
reservation price. Discussions on the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the
relaxations of these technical assumptions will be provided in §4 where we discuss extensions of
the basic model.

3. Analysis
We start our analysis by examining firms’ equilibrium decisions regarding email
targeting. After receiving targeting emails from both firms, Firm 1's weak loyal consumers who
search for prices and opt in (i.e. consumers in the w1βθ segment) compare the two email offerings
and buy at Firm 1 if and only if pw1βθ1e – pw1βθ2e ≤ L and pw1βθ1e ≤ 1. Therefore, competition for
this segment results in Firm 1 charging L and Firm 2 charging 0 in equilibrium. Consequently,

5

This assumption on L is similar to that made in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990) (page 291).

6

For a consumer in the strong loyal segments, her cost of going to the website she is not loyal to is irrelevant to our

analysis. For a consumer in the weak loyal segment, her cost of going to the website she is not loyal to can be
regarded as a part of L.
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Firm 1 obtains a profit of βθL and Firm 2 obtains zero profit from this segment.7 Similarly, in
equilibrium Firm 1 charges 0 and Firm 2 charges L for Firm 2’s weak loyal consumers who
search and opt in (the w2βθ segment). Firm 1 obtains zero profit and Firm 2 obtains a profit of
βθL from this segment.

Overall, each firm obtains a total profit of βθL from the consumers

targeted by emails.
Now consider the market for firms’ posted prices. Denoting πio and πi as firm i’s profit
associated with its posted price and its total profit respectively, we have πi =πio+βθL where

πio = 0

if pi > r,

(1)

πio = pi

if 1 < pi ≤ r,

(2)

πio = pi + pi(1-β)

if pi > pj+ L and pi ≤ 1,

(3)

πio = pi + pi(1-β) + piβ(1-θ)

if pj –L ≤ pi ≤ pj+ L and pi ≤ 1,

(4)

πio = pi + pi(1-β) + 2piβ(1-θ) if pi < pj –L and pi ≤ 1.

(5)

In the above equations, pi is Firm i’s profit from its strong loyal segment when pi ≤ r and
pi(1-β) is Firm i’s profit from its weak loyal consumers who do not search when pi≤1.When pj –L
≤ pi ≤ pj + L and pi ≤ 1, Firm i gets its weak loyal consumers who neither search nor opt-in for
email lists. Its profit from those consumers is piβ(1-θ) as shown in (4). Finally, when pi < pj –L
and pi≤ 1, Firm i gets both its own and the competitor’s weak loyal consumers who do not search
and do not opt in email lists. Its profit from them is 2piβ(1-θ) as shown in (5).
By the same logic as in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990), firms’ equilibrium posted prices
may involve mixed strategies. Solving for firms’ optimal decisions based on the profit functions
given in equations (1)-(5), we can obtain firms’ equilibrium posted prices (or expected posted
prices, Ei(p), in the case of mixed strategy equilibrium) and total profits as described in Lemma 1
below.

Lemma 1: Firms' competition in posted prices results in equilibrium in one of the
following five exhaustive and mutually exclusive parameter regions.
7

If firms incur positive variable costs and/or fixed costs to send emails, both firms’ equilibrium pricing decisions are

in mixed strategies. Firm 2 has positive probability of not sending emails and it charges non-zero price. However,
the resulting equilibrium profits are the same as in the case where emails are costless. Therefore, our analysis below
is not affected.
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Region I

(r<2-βθ and L ≥

β (1 − θ )
):
2 + β − 2 βθ

pIi=1, πIio=2-βθ, and πIi=2-βθ(1-L).
Region II

(r<2-βθ and

Ei ( p ) =

β (1 − θ )
r
2 − βθ
−
≤L<
):
2 − βθ 2 + β − 2 βθ
2 + β − 2 βθ

pn (2 − βθ )
1− L
1
1
1
2 − βθ
[ln
+ L(1 −
+
) + pn (1 −
) + 1] + pn −
pn ( pn − L )
pn pn − L
pn − L
β (1 − θ )
β (1 − θ )

π ioII = pn (2 − βθ ) , π iII =
Region III

2 − βθ
(2 − βθ ) 2
+ 2 L , where pn =
+L.
2 + β − 2 βθ
2 + β − 2 βθ

(r<2-βθ and L < min(

Ei ( p ) =

β (1 − θ )
r
2 − βθ
,
−
) ):
2 + β − 2 βθ 2 − βθ 2 + β − 2 βθ

r
1− L
2
1
1
1
r
(2 − βθ )r
[ln
+ L(
−
−
) + (1 −
)+
] + (1 − L) −
pn ( pn − L )
pn − L pn 1 − L
pn − L 1 − L
β (1 − θ )
β (1 − θ )

π ioIII = r , π iIII = r + βθL , where pn =
Region IV

(r≥2-βθ and L < 1 −

r
,
2 − βθ

r
):
2 + β − 2 βθ

pIVi=1-L, pIVj=r, πIVio=[2+β(1-2θ)](1-L), πIVjo=r,

πIVi=[2+β(1-2θ)]-[2+β(1-3θ)]L,

πIVj=r+βθL.
Region V (r≥2-βθ and L ≥ 1 −

r
):
2 + β − 2 βθ

pVi=r, πVio=r and πVi=r+βθL.

The proof for Lemma 1 can be found in the appendix. Lemma 1 provides firms'
equilibrium posted prices and profits under different regions of parameter values. An example of
the equilibrium regions is shown in Figure 1 for r = 1.8 and L = 0.25.

[Figure 1 Here]
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The equilibrium is in pure strategy for Region I, IV and V but is in mixed strategy for
Region II and III. Detailed results relating to the price distributions in mixed strategy equilibrium
can be found in the appendix.
As illustrated in Figure 1, when few consumers search for price information (β is small),
the equilibrium will be in Region I. In this region, firms have no incentive to undercut each
other’s price because the size of competitor’s weak loyal consumers who may switch (wjβ(1-θ)) is
small and the potential loss of revenue from a firm’s own strong loyal consumers (si) and weak
loyal consumers who do not search (wi(1-β)) is large. Moreover, firms have an incentive to sell to
the wi(1-β) segment because r < 2 by assumption and the size of this segment, which is 1-β, is
large. Therefore, both firms set pi = 1 in equilibrium. The total profit for Firm i is a decreasing
function of βθ while 2βθ is the total size of consumers targeted by emails. This is because the
email targeting market is more competitive than the posted prices market. As the result, the flow
of consumers from the posted price market to the email targeting market reduces firms’ profits.
When a large number of consumers search for prices but few of them are targeted by
emails (β is large but θ is small), the equilibrium will be in Region II. In this region, the wjβ(1-θ)
segment is large enough so that firms have incentive to undercut each other’s price and the
equilibrium result is similar to that in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990) where firms adopt mixed
strategy in pricing. Firms’ expected equilibrium prices and total profits decrease as β increases.
This is because as more consumers search for prices, firms compete more aggressively in the
posted prices market and more consumers will be targeted by emailed discounts as well. We can
also verify from Lemma 1 that, as consumer acceptance of email targeting (θ) increases, a firm’s
expected equilibrium price (Ei(p)) increases but its total profit, (πi) decreases. On one hand, an
increase in θ results in more consumers in the highly competitive email targeting market, which
reduces a firm’s profit. On the other hand, an increase in θ leaves smaller wjβ(1-θ) segments for
firms to compete for, which leads to higher Ei(p).
When a large number of consumers search for price information (β is large) and θ
increases relative to its values in Region II, the equilibrium will be in Region III if the
reservation price of strong loyal consumers (r) is large enough. Similar to Region II, firms also
adopt mixed strategies in this region. Each firm’s profit from its posted price is r, which is its
guaranteed profit from the strong loyal segment. Firms’ total profit increases when β and/or θ
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increases as the revenue from the email targeting market increases. Unlike Region II, Ei(p) can
actually increase as β increases when θ is large enough. Firms have little incentive to compete in
this case because a large θ implies a small switching segment wjβ(1-θ) and a large r implies a big
loss of revenue from the strong loyal segment if a firm undercut its competitor to lure the
potential switchers. Therefore, instead of lowering their prices as more consumers search prices,
firms in this situation become more likely to charge r to secure its profit from the strong loyal
segment and shun away from the more price sensitive “price searchers”.8 The change of Ei(p)
with respect to θ is similar to that in Region II and the same intuition applies. It is interesting to
notice that in this region the profit and price implications of increasing consumer search (β) can
actually be opposite to the conventional wisdom that lower search costs implies lower prices and
profits (as discussed in detail in the introduction). We discuss this somewhat surprising result in
greater detail later in this section.
As shown in Figure 1, if the number of consumers searching for price information is large
(β is large) and their acceptance of email targeting (θ) further increases from its values in Region
III, the equilibrium will be in Region IV. In this region, the wjβ(1-θ) segment is still sufficiently
large so that one firm (Firm i) has incentive to undercut the price of the other firm (Firm j) to
obtain those switchers. However, given Firm i’s price at 1-L, the wiβ(1-θ) segment is not large
enough for Firm j to lower its price to compete for. Instead, it is optimal for Firm j to sell only to
its strong loyal customers in this situation. Firm j's profit increases with βθ as its revenue from
email targeting increases and its profit from the posted price market is constant. Firm i's profit
decreases with θ because a larger θ shifts more consumers to the more competitive email
targeting market. When θ is small, Firm i's profit increases with β because larger β at small θ
implies that Firm i can capture more consumers from its competitor with its posted price.
However, when θ is large, Firm i's profit decreases with β because an increase in β under large θ
moves more consumers from the posted price market to the lower priced email targeting market.
Finally, if the number of consumers searching for price information is large and their
acceptance of email targeting (θ) is also high (both β and θ are large), the equilibrium will be in
Region V. In this region, Both the wjβ(1-θ) and the wi(1-β) segments are so small that neither firm
8

Technically speaking, in this case the probability mass at pi=r increases in the mixed strategy equilibrium as β

increases.
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has incentive to undercut the price of the other firm to obtain the switching segment and each
firm sells only to its strongly loyal customers. Both firms’ profits increase with βθ as their
revenue from email targeting increases and their revenue associated with the posted prices is
constant.
It is easy to verify that, across all regions, firms' equilibrium posted prices and total
profits are non-decreasing as r increases and/or L increases. The intuition behind it is very
obvious because an increase in r increases the overall willingness to pay of consumers in the
market and an increase in L reduces competition between firms.
Our main interest of the paper is to understand the joint impact of consumer search
behavior and firms' targeting activities on market competition. Based on Lemma 1 and the
discussion following it, we summarize the impact of consumer price search on firms' posted
prices and total profits in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Impact of Consumer Price Search): If consumer acceptance to email

targeting (θ) is small, firms' equilibrium posted prices are non-increasing and their equilibrium
profits decrease as more consumers search for prices from competing firms (i.e. as β increases).
However, if consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ) is sufficiently large, both firms'
equilibrium posted prices and their equilibrium profits can increase as more consumers search
for prices from competing firms.
Proposition 1 can be proved using the results of Lemma 1. If consumer acceptance to
email targeting (θ) is small, the equilibrium is in Region I when the size of the search segment
(β) is small or is in Region II when β is large. From our early discussion, firms’ posted prices
are non-increasing and profits are decreasing with respect to β in both regions. Moreover, we
also have pIIi <pIi and πIIi <πIi so that both equilibrium posted prices and profits decrease when
the equilibrium shifts from Region I to Region II. Therefore, we can obtain the first part of
Proposition 1. If θ is sufficiently large, as illustrated in Figure 1, the equilibrium will lie in
Region III, IV or V when β is large. Based on our early discussion, firms' equilibrium posted
prices and profits can both increase with β in those regions. This leads to the second part of
Proposition 1.
Intuitively speaking, Proposition 1 is the result of two opposing effects of consumer price
search activities on market competition. Obviously, there is a competition effect: an increase in

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2002

17

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1

consumer price search intensifies competition between firms. As more consumers search prices
across competing firms, firms are more likely to undercut each other’s posted prices. In addition,
more consumers will be targeted by emails with even lower prices. This effect of consumer price
search has a negative impact on firms’ prices and profits, which is consistent with conventional
wisdom.
However, there is also a price discrimination effect. An increase in consumer price
search activities provides firms better information about those “price searchers” and gives firms
the opportunity to price them differently from the other consumers. As a result, an increase in
consumer price search enables firms to better price discriminate between their strong loyal
consumers and weak loyal consumers. Consequently, it can lead to higher posted prices and
profits. This effect becomes stronger as the consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ) increases.
When θ is sufficiently large, the price discrimination effect will dominate the competition effect.
Hence, firm’s posted prices and total profits can both increase.
The first part of Proposition 1 confirms the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of
consumer price search on firms’ prices and profits. However, the second part of Proposition 1
contradicts conventional wisdom and shows that, in the presence of email targeting, an increase
in consumer price search activities (or a reduction in consumer price search cost as

∂β
≤ 0 ) in a
∂C

market can indeed increase firms’ prices and profits. This result suggests that lowered consumer
price search cost online (e.g. through using shopbots) may lead to either lower or higher
observed online prices depending on the effectiveness of firms’ email targeting (which is
captured by θ). Thus, this proposition offers reconciliation to the seemingly divergent empirical
findings regarding online retail prices as we mentioned in Introduction.
The Internet in general and shopbots in particular have drastically reduced consumer
search costs for prices. Therefore, it will be interesting to compare firms’ prices and profits
under extreme values of β, which correspond to big differences in consumer search costs. We
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: If both consumer acceptance to email targeting (θ) and consumer

heterogeneity in willingness to pay (r) are sufficiently large, firms’ posted prices and profits are
higher in the case where a sufficiently large proportion of consumers search for prices (β→1)
than in the case where no consumer searches for prices (β = 0).
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Corollary 1 is easy to verify. As shown in Lemma 1, the equilibrium falls in Region I at
β=0. The corresponding posted prices and profits are pIi=1 and πIi=2. At β→1 and θ→1,
however, the equilibrium falls in Region V with corresponding posted prices and profits pVi = r
and πVi = r + βθL. Therefore, we have pVi> pIi and πVi(β→1,θ→1) → r+L>2=πIi as r→2. The
same results can be obtained by comparing posted prices and profits in Region III or IV to
Region I. Actually, as demonstrated in Figure 1, θ need not be very high for the equilibrium to
be in Region III, IV or V. Therefore, Corollary 1 holds for a large range of parameter values of
θ. Corollary 1 extends the conclusion in Proposition 1 by indicating that with the presence of
email targeting, firms’ prices and profits can increase not only with a marginal decrease but also
with a dramatic decrease in consumer price search cost.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 reveal the impact of consumer price search on equilibrium
outcomes with different levels of email targeting activities. We now look at the impact of θ, i.e.
consumer acceptance of email targeting (or in other words, the effectiveness of targeting emails),
on firms' posted prices and total profits. The results are given in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 (Impact of Targeting Emails): If the proportion of consumers searching

prices (β) is small, firms' equilibrium posted prices are non-decreasing and their equilibrium
profits decrease as more consumers are targeted by emails (i.e. as θ increases). However, if the
proportion of consumers searching prices (β) is sufficiently large, both firms' equilibrium posted
prices and their equilibrium profits can increase as more consumers are targeted by emails.
Similar to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 can be proved using the results of Lemma 1. If β
is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is either in Region I for all θ or in Region I then Region II
as θ increases. In both cases, we have firms' posted prices non-decreasing and profits decreasing
with respect to θ. If β is sufficiently large, the equilibrium will fall in Region III, IV or V when
θ is large. From the discussion following Lemma 1, firms' equilibrium posted prices can increase
in those regions as θ increases and their values can be higher than those in the cases where θ is
small (i.e. in Region I or II). Also from Lemma 1, firms’ equilibrium profits in those regions
increase with θ as well.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that for Proposition 1. First, there is a
competition effect. An increase in targeting activities (θ) intensifies competition between firms
because the email targeting market is more competitive than the posted prices market.
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Obviously, this effect has a negative impact on firms' posted prices and profits. Second, there is
also a price discrimination effect. An increase in targeting coverage further separates “price
searchers” from strong loyal consumers and thus enables firms to better price discriminate
between them. This price discrimination effect has a positive impact on firms' posted prices and
profits.

When consumer search activities are limited (β is small), the competition effect

dominates the price discrimination effect since the email targeting market is very competitive
compared to the posted prices market. This is because though the size of targeted consumers may
be large due to high opt-in, the ability to price discriminate is small due to the small β.9
Moreover, since most consumers do not search, the market for posted prices is not very
competitive.

However, when β is large, the price discrimination effect dominates the

competition effect. Now the targeting market is not very competitive compared to the posted
price market because a larger β leads to more competition even in the market of posted prices.
Furthermore, the size of targeted consumers becomes large so that the benefit from price
discrimination increases.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate the importance of investigating the impact of consumer
price search and firm targeting behavior using an integrated approach. The interaction between
consumer price search and firms' email targeting is captured by βθ in our model. When this
interaction is small (i.e. either β or θ is small), the results in the two propositions converge to
similar conclusions as in the previous literature (Bakos 1997, Thisse and Vives 1988, Shaffer and
Zhang 1995). However, when this interaction is strong (i.e. both β and θ are large), the opposite
is true. In the context of the Internet, the interaction between consumer price search and firms'
email targeting tends to be strong. On one hand, consumers empowered by Internet technologies
such as shopbots can compare prices across several stores at one shot using a few "clicks".
Consequently, their product preferences and price sensitivities are revealed to firms through their
search activities and the resultant purchase decisions. On the other hand, firms equipped with
emails servers and electronic databases can gather a large amount of consumer information
online in real time and target consumers individually with negligible cost. This enables firms to
price discriminate and helps mitigate (and even overcome) the competitive pressures on firm
prices and profits. Therefore as suggested by Propositions 1 and 2, the implications of the
9

When β is small, most people do not search so that their types cannot be identified.
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reduced consumer price search cost on market competition can be very different from the
predictions made by current theory that do not consider the interactions between shopbots and
email targeting in the context of the Internet. As we explain in the introduction, our predictions
are also consistent with the empirical findings of Clay et al. (2001), who have found that recently
prices in the online book market have tended to rise.
Before concluding our analysis of the basic model in this section, we briefly discuss the
welfare implications of consumer price search activities and firms' ability to target online. An
interesting result is given in Corollary 2 below.
Corollary 2 If a large number of consumers search prices and accept targeting emails

(i.e. both β and θ are large), some consumers who do not receive targeted emails will not buy
from either firm. Nevertheless, in this condition (i.e. when both β and θ are large), an increase in
the number of consumers who search prices and/or accept targeting emails (i.e. as β and/or θ
increase) can increase both total consumer welfare and firms’ profits.
Corollary 2 is directly obtained from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 and 2. If the
equilibrium is in Region I or II, all consumers are served in the market. Thus, consumer welfare
increases (decreases) as firms’ profits decreases (increases) in those regions. However, if the
equilibrium is in Region III, IV or V (where both β and θ are large enough), some weak loyal
consumers who do not receive targeting emails may not buy from either firm because at least one
firm sets its posted prices at r with nonzero probabilities. Consequently, there are losses in total
social welfare. As β and/or θ increase in those regions, more consumers will be served through
the email targeting market and thus total social welfare increases. Consequently, it is possible for
both firms and consumers to be better off when β and/or θ increase. For example, firms’ profits
increase with respect to β and θ in Region V. The total consumer welfare in this region is
W=2(r+βθ-πVi)= 2βθ(1-L). It increases with respect to β and θ as well.
Corollary 2 implies that consumers who do not search or do not like to receive targeting
emails can be left out of the market by high prices, and this results in a loss of social welfare.
However, given existing high levels of consumer search activities and firms’ targeting efforts,
any further increase in consumer price search and targeting emails may actually improve total
consumer welfare and benefit firms simultaneously. It is interesting for the Internet policy
makers that consumers who are dissatisfied with online privacy and therefore refuse to opt-in can
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be left out of the market when much of the market place is satisfied with the privacy standards
and therefore opts in.

4. Extensions
In this section, we extend our basic model in several respects to obtain additional insights
on the joint impact of consumer price search and firms targeting on market competition. First, in
§4.1, we endogenize the level of consumer search and opt-in by explicitly modeling consumers’
price search and opt-in behavior as determined by their costs of search and opt-in and the
expected gains from doing so. In §4.2, we relax the symmetry assumption of firms and discuss
the competitive implications of consumer price search and firms’ email targeting in the context
of asymmetric firms. Finally, in §4.3, we investigate the robustness of our main conclusions by
relaxing the technical assumptions we make in the basic model.
4.1. Endogenous Price Search and Opt-In Decisions

In the basic model, we treat the number of consumers who search prices from competing
firms (β) and consumers' opt-in decisions (θ) as exogenous. In this section, we extend the basic
model to allow consumers' price search decisions as well as their decisions to opt into firms'
email lists to be endogenous. These decisions are determined by trading off the costs and the
expected gain from search and opt-in.
Assume that search costs are uniformly distributed on [0,Cs] and opt-in costs are
uniformly distributed on [0,Ct] for consumers in the weak loyal segments. Let γ be the size of
the price search segment among each firm’s weak loyal consumers who are not targeted by
emails and φ be the size of each firm’s weak loyal consumers who are targeted by emails (i.e. opt
in). γ corresponds to β(1- θ) and φ corresponds to βθ in our basic model. Let gs and gt be the
expected gains from price search and opt-in excluding the costs of doing so, respectively. We
have that gs =gs(γ,φ) and gt=gt(γ,φ). Obviously, γ is a function of Cs and gs(γ,φ) and φ is a
function of Ct and gt(γ,φ). As detailed in the appendix, we can show that

∂γ
∂φ
≤ 0,
≤ 0,
∂Cs
∂Ct

∂γ
∂φ
≥ 0 , and
≤ 0 in equilibrium. This leads to the following proposition.
∂Ct
∂Cs
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Proposition 3: The number of consumers who price search and the number of consumers

who opt-in are non-decreasing as consumers’ search costs decrease. As the costs of opt-in
decrease, the number of consumers that accept firms' targeting emails is non-decreasing but the
number of consumers that price search is non-increasing.
The first part of proposition 3 further confirms the key intuition of the paper: consumer
price search behavior and firms' targeting activities are highly correlated. Proposition 3 indicates
that as the Internet reduces consumer search costs, not only more consumers will engage in price
search but more consumers will also opt-in and can be targeted by competing firms.
Consequently, when consumer search cost drastically reduces online, firms' profits and prices
can actually increase as shown in the basic model.
The second part of proposition 3 shows that if the cost of opt-in reduces (e.g. consumers
become less concerned about privacy violations), more consumers tend to accept targeting
emails. As a result, firms have fewer consumers to compete for in the posted prices market. This
reduces firms' incentive to compete in the market of post prices and thus the expected gain for
the consumers who search but do not opt-in also decreases. Therefore, the volume of price
searchers tends to decline as the opt-in cost reduces. This result appears to be consistent with
lower than expected price search activities observed online as reported by Johnson et al. (2001).
They found limited consumer search activities for books, CDs and travel sites. Internet firms in
those product categories, such as Amazon, CDNow and Expedia, are well known for their
extensive use of targeted emails.
4.2. Asymmetric Firms

So far, our discussion was limited to competition between symmetric firms. However,
the main conclusions we derive from the basic model also apply to the case where the competing
firms are asymmetric. To demonstrate this, we focus on the equilibrium corresponding to Region
I and V in Lemma 1. Assume that the size of Firm 1’s strong loyal segment is λs>1, the size of
its weak loyal segment is λw>1, the reservation price of its strong loyal segment is r1>r with
λsr1<λs+λw, and the minimum price difference needed for its weak loyal consumers to switch is
L1>L. Let Firm 2 be the same as in the basic model.

For the email targeting market, Firm 1

charges L1 and Firm 2 charges 0 to Firm 1’s weak loyal consumers in equilibrium. The resulting
profits are λwβθL1 for Firm 1 and 0 for Firm 2. Similarly, Firm 2 obtains a profit of βθL and
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Firm 1 obtains no profit from Firm 2’s weak loyal consumers in the email targeting market. If
β→0, the equilibrium for the posted prices is pI1=pI2 =1, which corresponds to Region I in the
basic case. Firms’ total equilibrium profits in this case are πI1=λs+λw[(1-βθ(1-L)] and πI2=2βθ(1-L). Both profits decrease with respect to β and θ, which are similar to our results from the
basic model.
However, if β→1 and θ→1, the equilibrium posted prices are pV1=r1 and pV2 =r, which
corresponds to Region V in the basic model. Firms’ total equilibrium profits in this case are
πV1=r1λs +λwβθL1 and πV2=r+βθL. Both profits increase with respect to β and θ and pVi is higher
than pIi. These results are similar to those in Proposition 1 and 2. Also, it is obvious that πVi can
be higher than πIi when r1 or r is sufficiently large, leading to the same conclusion as Corollary 1.
Comparing changes of firms’ profits at β = θ = 1 to β = 0, we have that
∆=(πV1|β=θ=1 - πI1|β=0)-(πV2|β=θ=1 - πI2|β=0) = (r1-1)λs-(r-1)-λw(1-L1)+(1-L)

(6)

It is easy to see that ∆ increases with r1, λs and L1 but decreases with λw. The reason
behind this result is as follows. Firm 1’s gain from the price discrimination effect increases when
r1 or λs increases and its profit from email targeting increases with respect to L1 as a larger L1
leads to less competition. However, an increase in λw puts more consumers into the more
competitive email targeting market and therefore reduces the firm’s profit. Thus, the firm with a
stronger market position (larger L) and a larger number of strong loyal consumers with higher
willingness to pay will benefit more as consumer search cost drastically reduces and firms’
targeting ability increases in the online world. However, a firm with only more weak loyal
consumers will benefit less than its competitor or could be even worse off in this new
competitive environment.
This result indicates that the value of loyalty is great in the online world and offers some
support for online firms trying very hard to build a large customer base in the hopes of future
competitive advantage. Our result however is particularly insightful as a warning that it is can be
a disadvantage to have a large customer base if the customer base lacks strong loyalty. A larger
customer base can be a competitive advantage only if it comes with a superior product or service
that inspires high loyalty.
4.3. Relaxation of Technical Assumptions
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We now relax several assumptions that we made to improve analytical tractability in the
basic model. An important assumption in the basic model is that a firm's strong loyal consumers
and weak loyal consumers who do not search (i.e. consumers in si, and wi(1-β)) have no incentive
to opt-in for targeting emails.

This assumption rules out firms’ incentive to target those

consumers. As we discussed in §2, this assumption holds as long as the cost of checking an email
is nonzero.

If this assumption does not hold (i.e. the cost of checking an email is zero), firms

can target consumers in wi(1-β) with price at 1 in Region V and, unlike in the basic model, their
profits will decrease with β in this region. However, even under this case, our results regarding
Region III is unchanged because it is optimal for wi(1-β) consumers not to opt into firms’ email
lists in this equilibrium10. Thus, we can still find situations where firms’ profits and prices
increase with β and θ after relaxing this assumption.
In the basic model we assume that the cost of visiting a website of the firm a customer is
loyal to is zero. If such cost is small but nonzero, the weak loyal consumers will not buy from
the firm they are loyal to, if they expect the firm’s price to be at 1 and the strong loyal consumers
will not buy if they expect the firm’s price to be at r. Consequently, the current equilibrium
results no longer hold to Region I, IV and V. However, we can easily overcome this problem by
slightly modifying our model as follows: Assume there are groups of consumers of size αs and
αw in the strong loyal segments and weak loyal segments respectively. Consumers in αs and αw
will buy from the firm offering lower prices (i.e. L=0 for them) and they always search.
Obviously, firms will charge the opt-in consumers from αs and αw zero prices in the email
targeting market. For the same reason as in the basic model, consumers who do not search have
no incentive to receive targeting emails as long as the cost of checking an email is nonzero. This
modified model allows consumers to incur a small cost to visit a website they are loyal to
because neither firm will set price at 1 or r with probability 1 in equilibrium. Except that, the
equilibrium results in this extended model are virtually the same as in the basic model for small

10

If a consumer in wi(1-β) switches from “opt-out” to “opt-in”, firms’ posted prices will increase because Firm i is

more likely to charge the posted price of pi=r. This is because there are fewer weak loyal consumers in the posted
price market. This implies that the consumer’s surplus will be reduced if she buys in the posted price market after
opting in. However she cannot gain in surplus by buying at the targeted prices, because Firm i will never charge her
a targeting price below 1.
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αs and αw. Indeed, our basic model can be regarded as a special case of this extended model
with αs →0 and αw→0. All insights from the basic model remain the same. We adopt the
simplified assumption in our basic model only to facilitate exposition.
Finally, we have assumed

1
1
1
<L< in the basic model. If L ≥ , firms will have no
6
3
3

incentive to compete with each other and thus consumers never have motivation to search. If
1
L≤ , similar to Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990), explicit solutions for mixed strategy
6

equilibrium corresponding to Region II and III are difficult to obtain. However, the results for
other regions are the same even for this case. Therefore, the essential conclusions from the basic
model remain robust.
5. Conclusion

The Internet has facilitated a number of tools such as shopbots and targeted emails.
Relative to the traditional offline retailing, these tools reduce the costs of information transfer
between firms and consumers by several orders of magnitude. Shopbots facilitate consumer price
comparison across a number of online firms at fairly low search costs. Emails reduce the firms’
cost of targeted communication with consumers. Since these tools have a major impact on how
consumers receive competitive price information when making a purchase, they have important
implications for price competition. In this paper, we investigate the implications of these tools
for online price competition by modeling the interactive effects between them for the first time.
A key insight that we obtained from our analysis is that an increase in price comparison
due to lower search costs provides firms the opportunity to learn about individual consumer
preferences and price sensitivity. The Internet facilitates such learning and allows targeted
marketing to consumers through emails. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that lower
search costs on the Internet intensifies price competition and reduces profitability, we
demonstrate that the competition intensification effect may be overwhelmed by the price
discrimination effect achieved from superior targeting ability on the Internet. This can raise
average prices and profitability of firms despite the reduction in search costs.
Our analysis offers interesting strategic insights for managers about how to address the
competitive problems associated with low search costs on the Internet:
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(1)

It suggests that firms should invest in better technologies for personalization and targeted
pricing so as to prevent the Internet from becoming a competitive minefield that destroys
firm profitability. In fact we show that low search costs can facilitate better price
personalization and can thus aid in improving the effectiveness of targeted pricing efforts.

(2)

The analysis also offers guidelines on online customer acquisition efforts. The critical issue
for competitive advantage is not in increasing market share per se, but in increasing the
loyalty of the customers. While a larger share of very loyal customers reduces competitive
intensity, surprisingly a larger share of customers who are not very loyal can be a
competitive disadvantage. In order for customer acquisition to be profitable, it should be
accompanied by a superior product or service that can ensure high loyalty.

(3)

Investing in online privacy initiatives that assures consumers that their private information
will not be abused other than to offer them “deals” is worthwhile. Such assurances will
encourage consumers to opt into firm mailing lists. This facilitates successful targeting
which in turn ameliorates the competitive threats posed by low search costs on the Internet.

(4)

When the overwhelming majority of customers are satisfied with online privacy, the
remaining privacy conscious customers who are not willing to pay a higher price to
maintain their privacy will be left out of the market. While this may be of some concern to
privacy advocates, it is interesting that total consumer welfare can be higher even if some
consumers are left out.
Our primary analysis captures the competitive implications of the interaction between two

institutions facilitated by the Internet: Shopbots and Emails. But our research question is more
fundamental: What is the nature of competition in an environment with low costs for both
consumer search and firm-to-consumer personalized communications? Our strategic insights
may therefore be beneficially applied to offline businesses that can replicate such an
environment. For example, offline retailers could have websites on which they post prices
allowing for easy price comparisons. They can use tools such as frequency programs to create
addressable databases that enable them to communicate with customers by direct mail or email
(as many airlines and stores do).
This research however is only a first step towards understanding the competitive
implications of the Internet. By design, we have focused on communication of only price
information to control for other effects. Previous research however has indicated that the
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communicating product-related information over the Internet can increase the perceived
differentiation among products and thus reduce competitive intensity (Zettelmeyer 1998).
Moreover, Lal and Sarvary (1999) distinguish between products with primarily digital and nondigital attributes and show that competition may be reduced on the Internet for products with
non-digital attributes. Future research therefore needs to evaluate the robustness of our insights
by incorporating finer aspects of consumer search.

References
Alba, J, J. Lynch and B. Weitz, C. Janiszewski, R. Lutz, A. Sawyer, and S. Wood (1997),
"Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer, and Manufacturer Incentives to
Participate in Electronic Marketplaces," Journal of Marketing, 61, 38-53, 1997.
Bailey, Joseph P. (1998), "Intermediation and Electronic Markets: Aggregation and Pricing in
Internet Commerce," Ph.D. Thesis, MIT.
Bakos, Yannis J. (1997), "Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic
Marketplaces,'' Management Science, 43,12, 1676-1692.
Brynjolfsson, Erik and Michael D. Smith (2000), "Comparison of Internet and Conventional
Retailers," Management Science, 46, 4, 563-585.
Chen, Yuxin, Chakravarthi Narasimhan and John Z. Zhang (2001), "Individual Marketing With
Imperfect Targetability," Marketing Science, 20, 1, 23-41.
Gaw, Jonathan (1998), “Online Sellers see Unexpected Trend: Loyalty,” December 14, Pg. C1.
Godin, Seth and Don Peppers (1999), “Permission Marketing: Turning Strangers into Friends
and Friends into Customers,” Simon and Schuster, New York, NY.
Johnson, Eric J., Wendy W. Moe, Peter S. Fader, Steven Bellman, and Gerald L. Lohse (2001),
"On the Depth and Dynamics of Online Search Behavior," Working Paper.
Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, and Eric Wolff (2001), "Prices and Price Dispersion on the
Web: Evidence From the Online Book Industry," NBER Working Paper.
Kuttner, Robert (1998), “The Net: A Market Too Perfect for Profits”, Business Week, May 11.
Lal, Rajiv and Miklos Sarvary (1999), "When and How is the Internet Likely to Decrease Price
Competition" Marketing Science, 1,4,485-503.
Narasimhan, Chakravarthi (1988), "Competitive Promotional Strategies,'' Journal of Business,
61, 4, 427-449.

http://services.bepress.com/roms/vol1/iss3/paper1

28

Chen and Sudhir: When Shopbots Meet Emails

Petersen, Andrea, "Private Matters: It Seems That Trust Equals Revenue, Even Online," Wall
Street Journal, 02/12/2001
Raju, Jagmohan S., V. Srinivasan and Rajiv Lal (1990), "The Effects of Brand Loyalty on
Competitive Price Promotional Strategies," Management Science, 36,276-303.
Shapiro, Carl and Hal Varian, Information Rules, Boston: HBS Press, 1999.
Shaffer, Greg and Z. John Zhang (1995), ``Competitive Coupon Targeting,'' Marketing Science,
14, 4, 395-416.
Stellin, Susan, "Marketers Get Help From E-Mail Experts," New York Times 08/21/2000
Thisse, Jacques-François and Xavier Vives (1988), "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price
Policy,'' The American Economic Review, 78, 1, 122-137.
Varian, R. Hal (1980), "A Model of Sales,'' The American Economic Review, 70, 4, 651-659.
Zettelmeyer, Florian (1998), ``The Strategic Use of Consumer Search Cost,'' Working paper,
University of California, Berkeley.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2002

29

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1

Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 and 2
If r<2-βθ and L ≥

β (1 − θ )
(Region I), then pi=1 in equilibrium with πio=2-βθ. This is because neither
2 + β − 2 βθ

firm would like to set pi=r as r<2-βθ. Also, neither firm has incentive to undercut its competitor’s price to get its
wβ(1-θ) segment because the profit of doing so is [2-βθ+β(1-θ)](1-L), which is less than 2-βθ for L ≥
If r<2-βθ and L <

β (1 − θ )
.
2 + β − 2 βθ

β (1 − θ )
, then each firm has incentive to undercut the other’s price in order to get
2 + β − 2 βθ

the wβ(1-θ) segment from its competitor. This is because [2-βθ+β(1-θ)](1-L)>2-βθ now holds. This scenario is
similar to the model discussed in Raju, Srinivasan and Lal (1990). The equilibrium involves mixed strategy because
Firm i has incentive to undercut Firm j’s price by L if pj is high enough but has incentive to increase its price if pj is
low enough. The mixed equilibrium is derived below. The logic of the proof follows Raju, Srinivasan and Lal
(1990).
First, let pn1 be the lowest price of Firm j that Firm i is willing to undercut. pn1>1-L must hold because (12L)[2-βθ+β(1-θ)]<2-βθ always holds as L >

1
by assumption. This implies that rather than undercut pj=1-L by
6

setting pi below 1-2L, Firm i is better off by setting pi=1 to secure its own wβ(1-θ) segment and obtain πio=2-βθ.
Since pn1>1-L, it can be solved from (pn1-L)[2-βθ+β(1-θ)]=2-βθ. This leads to pn1 =

2 − βθ
+L.
2 + β − 2 βθ

Next, let pn2 be the lowest price Firm i will charge if such price does not undercut Firm j’s price by L.
Because Firm i can at least obtain πio=r by setting pi =r, we have pn2(2-βθ)=r. Thus, pn 2 =

Now consider the case where pn=max(pn1,pn2)=pn1, i.e.

r
.
2 − βθ

r
2 − βθ
−
≤ L . This is corresponding to
2 − βθ 2 + β − 2 βθ

Region II in Lemma 1. In this case, Firm i’s price support is pi∈[pn,1]∪ (pn-L,1-L) because 1) neither firm would
undercut price lower than pn by L and 2) for any pj≤1-L, Firm i would like to secure its own wβ(1-θ) segment by
setting pi=pj+L rather than undercut pj by setting pi below pj-L. No probability mass can exist at 1-L because Firm i
can undercut pj=1 to obtain the wjβ(1-θ) segment only at pi below 1-L. Also, probability mass cannot exist at pn-L
because Firm i will set pi=1 rather than pn-L if pj=pn. Denoting Hi(p)=Pr(pi≥p), we have the following equations
from the profit-invariant nature of mixed strategy equilibrium.
πio=pi[(2-β)+β(1-θ)Hj(pi-L)], if pn≤pi≤1

(A1)

πio=pi{(2-β)+2β(1-θ)Hj(pi+L)+β(1-θ)[1-Hj(pi+L)]}, if pn-L<pi<1-L

(A2)
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πio=pi(2-βθ) if pi=pn

(A3)

Thus, the equilibrium profit and price distribution for Firm i are πio=pi(2-βθ) and

H i ( p) =

π io
2−β
−
− 1 , if pn≤pi≤1;
β (1 − θ )( p − L) β (1 − θ )

(A4)

H i ( p) =

π io
2−β
−
, if pn-L<pi<1-L .
β (1 − θ )( p + L) β (1 − θ )

(A5)

The probability mass at 1 is given by q1=Hi(1) and the probability mass at pn is given by qn=Hi(1-L)- Hi(pn). The
expected equilibrium price of each firm can then be derived from its definition:
Ei ( p ) = ∫

1− L
pn − L

−

1
∂H i ( p )
∂H ( p )
pdp + ∫ − i
pdp +qn pn + q1 .
p
n
∂p
∂p

The result is as provided in Lemma 1.
If pn=max(pn1,pn2)=pn2, i.e. L <

r
2 − βθ
−
, we have the Region III in Lemma 1. In this case,
2 − βθ 2 + β − 2 βθ

Firm i’s price support is pi∈{r}∪ (pn,1]∪ (pn-L,1-L]. Comparing to Region II, r is on the price support but there is
no probability mass at pn. This is because instead of setting pi=pn Firm i will be better off setting pi=r in this case.
There can be a probability mass at 1-L because Firm i can now charge pi=1-L in order to get the wjβ(1-θ) segment not
(A1)-(A5) still hold in this region by replacing (A3) with πio=pi if pi=r. Therefore,

served by Firm j when pj=r.

πio=r in equilibrium and the probability mass at 1-L is given by q1-L=Hi(1-L)- Hi(pn). In addition, we have that
πio=pi[(2-βθ)+β(1-θ)Hj(r)] if pi=1-L,

which implies that qr = H i (r ) =

(A6)

π io
2−β
−
− 1 . Since Hi(r)= Hi(1) obtained from (A4), there is no
β (1 − θ )(1 − L) β (1 − θ )

probability mass at pi=1, i.e. the equilibrium price support is actually pi∈{r}∪ (pn,1)∪ (pn-L,1-L] in this case.
Similar to Region II, the expected equilibrium price of each firm can then be derived from its definition:
Ei ( p ) = ∫

1− L
pn − L

−

1
∂H i ( p )
∂H ( p)
pdp + ∫ − i
pdp +q1− L (1 − L) + qr r ,
p
n
∂p
∂p

which leads to the result reported in Lemma 1.
If r≥2-βθ, Firm i will never charge a price below r if it cannot undercut the other firm’s price by L to get
the wjβ(1-θ) segment. If L < 1 −

r
, i.e. in Region IV, Firm i has incentive to set price at 1-L to get Firm j’s
2 + β − 2 βθ

wβ(1-θ) segment when pj=r because (1-L)[2-βθ+β(1-θ)]>r.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2002

However, Firm j has no incentive to further undercut

31

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1

Firm i by setting pj=1-2L because (1-2L)[2-βθ+β(1-θ)]<r as r≥2-βθ and L >

1
. Therefore, we have pi=1-L, pj=r,
6

πio=[2+β(1-2θ)](1-L) and πjo=r in the equilibrium.
Finally, we are in Region V if r≥2-βθ and L ≥ 1 −

r
. In this case neither firm has incentive to
2 + β − 2 βθ

undercut the other firm for the wjβ(1-θ) segment by setting pi below r because (1-L)[2-βθ+β(1-θ)]≤r. Therefore, pi=r
and πio=r in the equilibrium.
Since the above regions are mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible values of parameters in the model,
we have equilibrium results derived for the entire parameter space.

The comparative statics of equilibrium profit

w.r.t. the parameters in the model are easy to obtain by examining the signs of first order derivatives. So do the
comparative statics of equilibrium price w.r.t. the parameters in the model for Region I, IV, and V. For Region II
and III, the comparative statics of expected equilibrium price w.r.t. the parameters in the model are obtained by
numerical examination because the expression of Ei(p) given in Lemma 1 is very complicated. Since all parameters
are confined to a closed range (1<r<2,

1
1
< L < , 0≤β≤1, and 0≤θ≤1), the numerical analysis provides thorough
6
3

results. The results regarding all such comparative statics are discussed following Lemma 1 and summarized in
Proposition 1 and 2.

A.2. Proof for Proposition 3
Because of the symmetric nature of the two firms, we only focus on the symmetric case where γ=γ1=γ2 and
φ=φ1=φ2 in equilibrium. For any given γ and φ, the equilibrium results of Lemma 1 still hold by letting β(1- θ)=γ and
βθ=φ. Let Sn be the surplus of a consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who does not search, Sγ be the surplus of a
consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who searches but does not opt in targeting emails, and Sφ be the surplus of
a consumer in a firm's weak loyal segment who opts in firms' targeting emails. Then by definition gs = Sγ- Sn and gt
= Sφ -Sγ. It is obvious that gs=0 if equilibrium happens at Region I, IV or V. Since gs=0 implies γ=0 which leads to
β=0 or θ=1, from Lemma 1, Region I and V can be in equilibrium but Region IV cannot. This is consistent with the
claim that φ=φ1=φ2 in equilibrium because Region IV is the only region where firms' strategies can be asymmetric.
For equilibrium at Region II, we have that Sn=1-E(p), Sφ=1-L. To calculate Sγ, notice that a consumer in γi
switches to buy from Firm j if pi-pj>L but she also incurs a disutility L for doing so. Therefore,

Sγ = 1 − {∫

1− L
pn − L

p

−∂H j ( p j )
1
1
pi − L
−∂H i ( p )
−∂H i ( p)
−∂H i ( pi )
dp + ∫ pH j ( p − L)
dp + ∫ [ ∫
( p j + L)
dp j ]
dpi
p
p
p
L
−
n
n
n
∂p
∂p
∂p j
∂pi

+ qn pn + H i (1 − L)q1 + [ ∫

1− L
pn − L

( p j + L)

−∂H j ( p j )
∂p j

dp j ]q1}.

For Region III, we still have Sφ=1-L. Sn = 1 − [ ∫

1− L
pn − L

p

1
−∂H i ( p )
−∂H i ( p )
dp + ∫ p
dp + qn pn + qr ] in this case
p
n
∂p
∂p

because if pi=r consumers in γ will not buy. Similar to Region II, we have
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Sγ = 1 − {∫

1− L
pn − L

p

−∂H j ( p j )
1
1
pi − L
−∂H i ( p)
−∂H i ( p )
−∂H i ( pi )
dp + ∫ pH j ( p − L)
dp + ∫ [ ∫
( p j + L)
dp j ]
dpi
−
p
p
p
L
n
n
n
∂p
∂p
∂p j
∂pi

+ q1− L (1 − L) + H i (1 − L)q1 + [ ∫

1− L
pn − L

( p j + L)

−∂H j ( p j )
∂p j

dp j ]q1}.

Since both Sγ and Sn are functions of γ and φ, gs and gt are also functions of γ and φ. Therefore, we have that
γ=γ(Cs,φ) and φ=φ(Ct,γ) in reduced forms. Thus,

To

∂φ ∂φ ∂γ
=
,
∂Cs ∂γ ∂Cs

(A7)

∂γ
∂γ
∂γ ∂φ
∂γ
∂γ ∂φ ∂γ
=
=
,
|φ +
|φ +
∂Cs ∂Cs
∂φ ∂Cs ∂Cs
∂φ ∂γ ∂Cs

(A8)

∂γ
∂γ ∂φ
=
,
∂Ct ∂φ ∂Ct

(A9)

∂φ
∂φ
∂φ ∂γ
∂φ
∂φ ∂γ ∂φ
=
=
.
|γ +
|γ +
∂Ct ∂Ct
∂γ ∂Ct ∂Ct
∂γ ∂φ ∂Ct

(A10)

prove Proposition 3, we first claim that

definition, γ = ∫

min( g s (γ ,φ ), Cs )

0

∂γ
|φ ≤ 0 . The proof is as follows. By
∂Cs

∂g s ∂γ
1
∂γ
∂γ
∂γ
dc − φ . Thus,
|φ =
|g s +
|Cs
|φ .
∂Cs
∂Cs
∂g s
∂γ ∂Cs
Cs

hold. Otherwise, if γ=γ0 is in equilibrium and

In equilibrium,

∂g s
≤ 0 must
∂γ

∂g s
> 0 at γ=γ0, more consumers would engage in price search (i.e. γ
∂γ

would be larger than γ0) because the expected gain from search increases as γ increases. This contradicts that γ0 is in
equilibrium. Hence, equilibrium cannot exist at

have

(i)

∂γ
|φ ≤ 0
∂Cs

in

equilibrium.

∂g s
∂g s
∂γ
∂γ
> 0 . Because
≤ 0,
|g ≤ 0 and
|C ≥ 0 , we must
∂Cs s
∂g s s
∂γ
∂γ

Similarly,

we

also

have

∂φ
|γ ≤ 0
∂Ct

in

equilibrium

because

∂gt ∂φ
∂g
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
|γ =
| gt +
|Ct
|γ , (ii)
|gt ≤ 0 , (iii)
|Ct ≥ 0 , and (iv) t ≤ 0 must hold in equilibrium (this
∂Ct
∂gt
∂Ct
∂Ct
∂gt
∂φ ∂Ct
∂φ

can be proved using the similarly argument as in the proof of

Next, we claim that

∂g s
≤ 0 ).
∂γ

min( g s (γ ,φ ), Cs ) 1
∂γ
≤ 0 . The proof is as follows. From γ = ∫
dc − φ , we have that
0
∂φ
Cs

∂g ∂γ ∂g s
∂γ
∂γ
=
+
|Cs ( s
) − 1 . Using the expressions of Sγ and Sn derived early, we can numerically verify that
∂φ ∂g s
∂γ ∂φ ∂φ
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∂g s
≤ 0 in equilibrium. The numerical analysis is thorough because all parameters are confined in finite interval.
∂φ
Since

∂g s
∂g s
∂γ
∂γ
≤ 0.
≤ 0,
≤ 0 in equilibrium, we must have
|Cs ≥ 0 and
∂g s
∂φ
∂φ
∂γ
Moreover, we claim that

in

γ

∂φ
∂φ
≥ 0 . The proof is as follows. To examine
, notice that for an ∆γ increase
∂γ
∂γ

, the corresponding increase in φ is ∆φ = ∆γ ∫

min( gt (γ + ∆γ ,φ +∆φ ), Ct )

0

min( gt (γ + ∆γ ,φ +∆φ ), Ct ) 1
1
dc + γ ∫
dc . The first term
min(
gt (γ ,φ ), Ct )
Ct
Ct

in the right side of the expression is an increase in φ due to more consumers engaging in price search. The second
term in the right side of the expression is a change in φ due to a change in gt resulting from a change in γ. Therefore,
∂ (γ gt )
∂φ ∂ (γ gt ) γ ∂gt ∂φ
=
+
. We can numerically verify that
≥ 0 for the entire parameter space. Because we
∂γ
Ct ∂γ
Ct ∂φ ∂γ
∂γ
also have

∂gt
∂φ
≥ 0.
≤ 0 in equilibrium, we must have
∂γ
∂φ

Finally, because

we must also have

and

∂γ
∂γ
∂φ
∂γ
≤ 0 , and
≥ 0 in equilibrium, from (A8) we must have
≤ 0 . Then
|φ ≤ 0 ,
∂Cs
∂φ
∂γ
∂Cs

∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂γ
≤ 0 from (A7). Similarly, we must have
≤ 0 from (A10) because
≤ 0,
|γ ≤ 0 ,
∂Cs
∂Ct
∂Ct
∂φ

∂φ
∂γ
≥ 0 in equilibrium. As a result,
≥ 0 must also hold according to (A9).
∂γ
∂Ct
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions (r = 1.8, L = 0.25)
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